This study estimates the value of policies that would mandare labeling of beef frcmi cattle produced with growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn. At no cost, 85 percent of respondents desired mandatory labeling of beef produced with growth horniones and 64 percent of respondents preferred mandatory labeling of beef fed genetically modified corn. Estimates suggest that consumel-s would be willing to pay 17.0 percent and 10.6 percent higher prices for beef on average to obtain information provided via mandatory labeling about whether the beef is from cattle produced with growth hormones or fed genetically modilied corn. respectively. Unlike most food products sold in a retail setting, beef is primarily sold as a genet-ic commodity with no brand name. Most consumers are currently unable to identify specific attributes they desire whcn p~~r c h a s i n g beel because of generic marketing strategies. Policy makers, who are interested in assuring that the public has enough information to make an informed choice, and beef packers, retailers, and cattle producers, who are interested in capturing additional profit by branding desirable beef attributes, have turned their attention toward branding and labeling beef products. Of interest in this regard is the role of government intervention in the beef labeling process. Caswell and Mojduszka suggest that the costs and benefits of labeling depend on food product attributes, which can generally be categorized as search, experience. or credence. An attribute is considered a search attribute if consurners can identify quality prior to purchase. either through inspection or through research. An experience attribute is one in which consumers can determine quality only after the product is purchased and consumed. In contrast, a credcncc attribute is one in which quality cannot be assessed even after purchase ~n d consumption. Several beef characteristics can be considered credencc attributes. For example, Inany cattle are produced with anabolic growth hormones and are fed genetically modified (GM) corn. However, consumers have no means of determining which beef products possess the attributes of "growth hormones" or "GM corn" before purchase o r even after consumption.
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or "GM corn" before purchase o r even after consumption.
Several conditions arise when a good, \uch as beef. possesses credence attributes (Darby and Karni) . First, consumers never acquire information about the product's quality, even after repeat purchases. This lack of information produces market inefficiencies. Akerlof showed how the presence of an information asymmetry could cause the market to fail by causing low-quality goods to drive high-quality goods out of the market. High-quality goods cannot capture a premium because consumers have incomplete information about the product. Thus low-quality goods prevail in the market. Secclnd, private tirrns are unable to signal quality through branding because consumers assume the firms will niisrepresent the true quality of the product because there is no verification. Consu~ners will only trust quality signals that con be verified by public certitication and governmental involvement.
Two issues motivate this study. First. consumers currently have little infor~nation abo~lt quality attributes when purchasing beef. This lack of information, or information asymnietry, causes markets to function inefficiently (Antle) . Second, consumers are not able to independently judge the quality of several beef attributes before purchase or after consumption. That is, they are credence attributes. As a product attribute moves along the continuum from being a search to experience to credence attribute, labeling c;tn be increasingly beneficial (Caswell and Mojduszka) . Because srvera1 beef characteristics are credence attributes, labeling can play an important role in increasing efticiency in consumer choice in the beet' market.
In this study we evaluate consumer demand for two mandatory labeling programs: a) labeling of beef from cattle administered growth hormones and b) labeling of beef from cattle fed genetically moditied corn.' The value of increased information provided via mandatory ' We estimate demand Ihr a mandatory labelilig program because of the credence nature of the hecf attributes of interest. Caswell listed foul-alternative labeling policies including n o labeling allowed. mandatory labeling of all products, voll~ntal-y labeling of all products, and voluntary labeling with a government disclaimer about the safety. Conv~lmers mistrust private labels is assessed by determining demand for the mandatory labeling programs at varied cost increases. Rather than evaluating the effects of the mandatory labeling program ex ,vast with actilal market-level data, as described by Caswell and Mo~duszka and empirically tested by Teisl, Bockstacl, and Levy, we ex n??te evaluate two potential ~nandatory labeling programs using contingent valuation (CV) survey ~nethods. To date. little yuantitative research has been directed at examining consurner demand for labeling of beef with these p:trticular attributes. Results of this study should be useful to policy makers considering the effects o f mandatory labeling policies, becf industry participants interested in revitalizing beel' demand. and cattle ~,roduce~-s planning for future changes in production practices.
The paper proceeds with a review of current beef labeling policies and previous research estimating the value of food product labeling. We then discuss two alternative mandatory beef-labeling programs. A concepti~al model for estimating consumer demand for mandatory labeling is then presented. The next section inclutles a description of the contingent valuation method employed to estimate consumer demand followed by a discussion of survey results. We conclutie the paper with a tiiscussion of our findings.
Current Beef Labeling Policies
The USDA has recently rnade several volunt;~ry labeling programs available to the beef' industry. The USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) administers a certified becf program. Under this program, beef can be given a specific "certified" label if certain breed or quality characteristics are met. Thirty-tive s~tch programs are registered with the AMS. The most notable of these certitication programs is Certitied Angus Beef (CAB). In general, these certified programs are aimed at pro- (or voluntary) attempts to signal quality of credence goods because of the lack of verification. As such, we are interested in determining consumer dernand for mandatol-y labcling.
viding consumers with information about experience attributes. For example, consumers may not be able to tell whether C A B tastes differently than non-CAB before purchase; however. the CAB label provides information about product quality that can only be ascertained after consumption. In theory, this information reduces search costs for consumers and increases market efficiency. lri addition to these programs, the USDA FSIS has instituted provisions to allow beef to be labeled as certified. organic, natural. or no hormones administered if certain requirements are met. These labels are primarily aimed at providing consumers with information about credence attributes. At this point, however, all such progranis are voluntary. Although a few firms, such as Coleman's Natural and Laura's I ,em, have employed these labels, their products only make up a very small pel-ccr~tage of beef that appears in the market and these products generally only appear in retailers located in affluent neighbol-hoods. Further, it is uncommon to see these beef products sold in the same meat case with non-branded beef, making it difficult to determine if consumer choice is driven by the meat label or dominated by choice of the particular retailer. Because sales of these products are limited and market data is held by private firms, little is currently known about the impact of these labeling programs. In addition to these pre-existing programs, othet-labeling policies have recently been the subjcct of debate. One labeling regulation, recently the topic of legislative activity. would require labeling of imported fresh beef (Food Safety lnspection Servicc (FSIS)). Proponents of the mandatory "country-of-origin" labeling claim that the program would allow consumers to make more informed choices when purchasing beef. Because consulners would be able to identify certain levels of quality or consistency with a particular country-of-origin label, consunler demand should be improveti (National Cattelnian's Beef Association). Another program. also introduced as legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives. would require mandatory nutritional labeling of fresh meat. If passed, nutritional labels similar to those currently on other food products would be required on all fresh beef.
Several studies have examined the value of nutritional labeling programs and mixed results wcre found. Teisl, Bockstael. and Levy, using scanner data fro111 grocei-y stores, found that the valuc of inforrnalion provided by brand-specific nutritional labels was generally positive and varied by comlnodity. For example, the value of nutritional information was about $0.50/nionth/household h r rnilk, about $0.30/month/household for peanut butter, a n d about $0.09/month/household f o r mayonnaise. In contrast, M(!jduszda and Caswell found that private nutritional labeling was generally ineffective at providing consumers with sufficient information about product quality. They concluded that mandatory nutritional labeling was necessary t o appropriately signal quality. Using a different approach, Mc).jduszda, Caswell, and Harris found that consumer preferences and purchasing patterns did not change signiticantly after mandatory nutritional labeling was adopted. However, consumers do not necessarily have to increase consumption of healthier foods for a positive value of infor~nation to exist (Teisl, Bockstael, and Levy) .
The impacts of a few bcef labeling practices have also been examined. Bureau, Marette. and Schiavina illustrated that the welfare impacts of European beef trade liberalization depend on the feasibility of low-cost labeling and the differences in perceived quality across countries. Whether the European Union's (ELJ) total welfare would increase should it remove its ban on US hormone treated beef strongly depends on whether imported US beef is labeled and the cost of the labeling. If the labeling were costless. Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina show that the EU could increase total welfart: by importing and labeling US beef; howcvcr, when labeling costs are positive, the welfare effects of trade liberalization depend o n consumers' perceptions of the dirference in quality between hormone treated and non-hormone treated beef and are generally a n~b i g uous. Loureiro and McCluskey examined consumer demand for geographically labeled meat in Spain in a hedonic framework. treated or GM fed beef is serioirsly considered, several issues require attention. First, there are costs associated with preserving the identity of "hormone-free" or "GM-free" beef from farm to retail levels. Further costs are associated with reduced production efficiencies when producers do not rely of the aid of growth hormones or GM corn in cattle production. 'There are also costs associated with monitoring a mandatory labeling program.
The cost of maintaining a high-quality monitoring entity to ensure labels are truthfully administered could be quite high. Second, consumer demand for these labeling programs must be assessed. If consumers are indifferent about labeling beef produced with growth hormones or GM corn and such a plan is instituted, a sub-optimal situation may arise. However. if consumer demand for the labeling program is increased by an amount larger than the labeling, segregating, and production costs. then mandatory labeling programs may be a beneficial way to increase beef industry welfare. Caswell and Padberg suggested evaluating food labeling policies in this costhenefit framework.
Conceptual Model
To examine the impacts of mandatory labeling of beef from cattle administered growth hormones or fed GM The value of the labeling program is equivalently stated in equation 3, which is the dual problem to equation 2. ' In this franlework it is important to r e a l i~e that utility is derived from the presence or absence of a label, not necessarily from the attributes of "hormone use" or "GM feed use." We are not estimating the demand for "hormone-free" or "GM free" beef, rather we arc interested in the value of a label on these products. Consumcr willingness-to-pay for "horrnone-free" or "GM free" beet' is an issue left unanswered by this research. See Lusk, Roosen, and Fox for estimates of the value "horn~one-free" or "CM free" hcef when perfect information about product quality is known. v,, WTP will be positive. 'That is, consumers (4) WTP" = sp + E who derive positive utility from the label will be willing to pay a premium for the added informaticjn. hi^ WTP or benetit of where x is a vector of socioeconomic explanthe labeling policy, can be colnpared with atory variables, P is a conformable vector of costs of the program. coefficients, anci r is an independently and identically distributed normal error with mean
Methods and Procedures
zero and variance cr2. Here, WTP:'' is a latent variable that it is not actually observed. What
To estimate consumer demand for mandatory labeling, a CV inail survey was developed. We used a standard CV approach with design complexity lying between the single-bounded (Hannelnan, 1984) and double-bounded dichotomous choice (Hanneman. Loornis, and Kanninen) methods. In the survey, participants were asked, "Would you favor mandatory labeling of beef that has been produced with growth hormones'?" As a follow-up question they were asked, "If you responded Yes, woi~ld you still prefer the niandatory labeling if it caused a k increase in the price of beef?" The price. k, was varied from 2 percent to 20 percent, and consumers ranclomly received a survey with one of the following price increases: 2, 5 , 10, 15, or 20 percent. Because prices of beef cuts vary considerably, we chose to clicit willingness to pay in terms of percentage rather than absolute dollar amounts. Constructing the questions in this one-and-onehalf bound clichotomous framework has been shown to capture most of the efficiency gains in moving from a single-bounded to doublebounded choice format (Cooper, Hanneman, and Signorello) . Following this question, consumers were asked to respond to identical cluestions ahout beef from an animal fetl genetically modified corn. An informatio~l sheet was provided to inform consumers about the two production practices.
To analyze the responses to the aforementioned CV questions. we employed a modified version of the interval censored CV model (Cameron, 1988: Cameron and James) that allowed for uncensored values of zero WTP l'or those respondents who answered No to the initial CV question. Assume that a consumer has a true WTP for the value of the label WTP*'. Further assume that is observed from the data is whether a respondent indicated a WTP greater than or less than a particular price, k. I n a traditional singlebounded dichotomous framework, respondents are presented with a price increase, k, and are asked if they would pay this amount. The probability of a Yes response is the probability No to the initial CV question has a WTP = 0, i.e., the range has been collapsed to their exact WTP One can readily see that this approach increases the accul-acy of the WTP estimates.
To operationalim our model we define three groups of respondents: Group D, who answered No to the initial WTP cluestionthese individuals have a n uncensored WTP = 0. Group D? who answered Yes to the initial WTP question and N o to the follow-up-these individuals have a WTP from [O, k] , and Group D, who answered Yes to both questions-these individuals have a WTP from [k, z] . Given these groups of respondents, the following likelihood function is formulated:
[k ;Tx@) where 4 and (11 are the standard normal density and distribution functions. respectively. As Cameron (1 988) suggests. the coefficient estimates in ( 5 ) can loosely be interpreted as the marginal effect of xi on WTI? Patterson and Duffield note that the interval-censored formulation is simply a reparameterization of the typical logit or probit models discussed in Hanemann (1984) . The advantage to this approach is the ease in which mean WTP estimates a n d confidence intervals can be calculated. Cameron (1 9 9 1 ) showed that the confidence interval for E(WTP) at significance lcvel ol is 
Results
Before administration of the full survey, a preliminary mailing was conducted to pretest the initial survey. Slight lnoditications were made based o n these responses ancl 2500 surveys were mailed in February 2000 to consumers in the 48 continental United States. 'l'wo hundred sixty six surveys were retiuned due to undeliverable addl-esses and 648 usable surveys were completed and returned resulting in a 29-percent usable response rate.l Summary statistics of the survey respondents are presented in Table 1 . A little over half the re--'The nailing list was purchasecl frorn a reputable privale company that randomly drew addresses horn telephone white pages. One dollar was included in the surveys to encourage participation. Sending follow-up notices to nonresponclents ~vould lihcly hove incl-eascd tllc response rate: howevcl; monetary and logi.;ticol cons~raints prevented such a procedure. spondents were female. The average respondent was 52 years of age with 15 year\ of education and a household income between $50,000 and $59,999 per year. Table 2 compares summary statistics of our survey sample with the U.S. population. The sample of consumers that responded to our survey had slightly higher incon~es and education as cornpared to the national statistics. However. our sample of respondents had roughly the same age, household size, and number of women as does the U.S. population. Any difference5 that exist between our sarnple and the IJ.S. population should be taken into consideration if generalizations are to he made about policy changes. In the following analysis our model estimates control for socioeconomic factors that could readily be manipulated to adjust for tlifference between our sample and the U.S. population.
As indicated in Table 1 , 85 percent of respondents indicated a preference f a -mandatory labeling of beef adrninistcr-ed growth hormones. However. only 68 percent desired labeling aftcr a price increase. Demand for labeling 01' beef froin cattle fed GM corn was lower than that for growth hormones. Only 64 percent of respondents prel'erred labeling of beef from cattle fed GM corn at no price increase. This number reduced to 52 percent when a cost was associated with the rnandntory labeling program. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents who preferred mandatory labeling at six price levels. As expected, Inore consumel-s preferred the mandatory labeling programs at no cost as opposed to a price increase. Further. demand for labeling generally declined as the price of the labeling increased. At every cost, demand for labeling of beef produced with growth hormones was higher than dcrnand for labeling of beef from cattle fed GM corn.
To quantify the influence of' consumer demographics on demand for labeling. eqnation randonily received a survey where k = 2 pcrcent. 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 pcrcent, or 20 percent. lihood function, is the expected WTP). Esti-with lesser concern. Although many of the demates suggest that consumers with higher mographic variables are statiftically insignifiincome are willing to pay a greater amount for cant, the WTP estimates are statistically difmandatory labeling of beef produced with ferent from zero. The expected W T P value for growth hormones than are lower-income con-mandatory hormone labeling is about 17 persumers. Further, consumers that express a cent, which implies that the "average" congreater concern for the safety of hormone use sumer is willing to pay 17-percent higher pric-(on a scale of 1 to 5) are willing to pay more es for beef to acquire information about for mandatory labeling than are consumers hormone production practices. The point esti- Consumer demand for nlandatory labeling of beef from cattle fed GM corn is less than that for hormone use. Estimates indicate that older and higher-educated consumers have higher WTP for mandatory GM labeling than younger and less-educated consumers. Further, those consumers with greatel-concern about the safety of GM feed use express a greater WTP than those with lesser concern. WTP point estimates from both Models 1 and 2 imply that consumers are willing to pay a 10.6-percent higher price for beef such that information is provided about animal feeding practices. Confidence intervals indicate that the WTP estimates are statistically different from zero and range from 12.8 percent to 8.5 percent for the full model.
Summary and Conclusions
Several beef labeling programs are currently being employed as a way to differentiate a market that has historically been dominated by sales of generic commodity products. Because several beef characteristics can be considered credence attributes, a role for government involvement in the labeling process exists. However, before federal action is taken the benefits of any particular labeling policy must be weighted against the costs. Critical in this assessment is the value of a labeling policy. This study provides direct estimates of the value of two potential mandatory labeling programs by utilizing responses to a contingent valuation mail survey. Specitically, we estimated the demand for two mandatory labeling strategies: labeling of beef from cattle a) produced with growth hormones and b) fed genetically modified (GM) corn.
In a survey of U.S. consumers we found that more respondents prefer labeling of beef produced with growth hormones than labeling of beef from cattle fed GM corn (85 percent versus 64 percent). Demand for both mandatory labeling programs was sensitive to increases in the price of beef associated with labeling, segregation, and monitot-ing costs. Because of the price sensitivity of the demand for labeling, it is important to consider costs of the mandatory labeling programs. Estimation results indicate that consumers will prefer mandatory labeling of beef produced with . . ,' Nuliihers in pal-cnthesea a[-c \tandarcl err-or\. I' WTP is the percentage i~~~,l-c'ase it1 the price of beef rcapondents arc willing t o pc~y for a nianclatory Inhel.
, c. . I 1 .
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growth hormones only il' labeling costs cause beel' prices to rise no more than 17 percent.
Further. consumers will prefer mandatory labeling of beef from cattle fed Gh4 corn it' 121-beling costs increase heel' prices n o more than 10.6 percent. R e s~~l t s of the analysis indicate that signilicant demand exists for a mandatory labeling program for beef udn~inistered growth hormones. However, several issues require attention before such a program is strongly considered. First. the costs of cattle segregation, lost production efficiencies. packaging. and program monitoring rnust be estimated to compare with the estimate value of the labeling program. If estimated costs increases a r e greater than 17 percent. our results indicate that beef consu~nption will suffer. Second. the estimated benefits of the labeling program sho~11~1 be studied in a non-hypothetical setting. Research has shown that consumers respond differently when answering hypothetical survey questions that when making actual non-hypothetical comments (Fox et a] ). Fill--ther, the short-run impacts of such a program need to be assessed. Because the vast majority of beef is currently procluccd with added growth hormones, and it is likely that c o n s u ners are unaware of this fact, short-run denland may fall until price signals from consumers at the retail level can be relayed to cattle producers. Finally, an interesting extension to this study would be to compare consumer demand for alternative labeling policies with varying degrees of government involvement. Theoretically, consumers are assumed to distrust priv a t e attempts to signal quality of credence attributes. However, m a n y f o o d manufacturers regularly advertise quality c r e d e n c e attributes through private l~lbels, which indicates that this assumption m a y h e a b l e t o h e relaxed in s o m e circumstances.
